Always available

Roles, service accounts and impersonation, locally.

The IAM API's custom and predefined roles, service accounts and keys, and IAM Credentials, served beside Resource Manager.

Backed by: CloudBurrow's project registry CloudBurrow

Get started
Local scope

What it covers

The IAM API is served from the same project registry as Resource Manager, over gRPC and REST, so the official clients, gcloud and Terraform reach it through the endpoints CloudBurrow sets up. Roles, service accounts and keys follow Google’s documented names, limits and refusals. A key file’s token endpoint is this instance, so signing in with it stays on your machine. Where one of the five checks consults a policy, custom roles and conditions are evaluated. Everywhere else the policy is a record of what your tool wrote, not a gate.

  • Custom roles in a project or the organization: create, get, list, update, delete and undelete, with Google's documented limits (#1743)
  • Google's predefined roles with their permissions, queryGrantableRoles and queryTestablePermissions (#1746)
  • Service accounts and their keys, enable, disable, delete and undelete, and each account's own policy (#1747)
  • IAM Credentials generateAccessToken, generateIdToken, signJwt and signBlob, checked against the caller's grants (#1747)
  • The certificate URLs of service accounts, which the instance's Cloud Storage uses to verify signed URLs (#1787)
  • Conditional role bindings on projects, folders, the organization and the services Google lists, and LintPolicy (#1742, #1745, #1751)
  • Verified gcloud iam commands and Terraform's custom role and service account resources
Release and main

What's verified

Follow the operation matrix to see what the backend serves and the tests linked to Verified calls.

IAM (custom roles, service accounts)

31 of 31 RPCs Verified in v0.3.0

IAM (custom roles, service accounts) in v0.3.0: 31 Verified of 31
Inspect the IAM (custom roles, service accounts) operation matrix →
Local boundaries

Not supported

  • 01 / Local boundary

    IAM policies are stored, not enforced, apart from five named checks: Memorystore for Redis Cluster and Valkey IAM auth, Firestore with MongoDB compatibility sign-ins and command permissions, IAM Credentials on service accounts the IAM API created, BigQuery's per-project IAM of a caller with a minted token, and BigQuery remote models' connection permissions.

  • 02 / Local boundary

    Those checks prove that this instance applies its own rule, not that a policy is right on Google. Calls as the instance's own account are not checked.

  • 03 / Local boundary

    Tokens and signatures are local. A signed URL or ID token made here is accepted by no Google service.

Evidence source

Source: docs/compatibility.md at main 0ea2594.

Frequently asked

Questions

Does IAM decide who may call a local service?

Only in five named places: Memorystore IAM auth, Firestore with MongoDB compatibility sign-ins, IAM Credentials impersonation, BigQuery's per-project checks of a minted token and BigQuery remote models' connection permissions. They evaluate roles, custom roles and conditions. Other services keep the policy you set and allow every request.
Link to this answer

What proves the IAM API works?

TestIAMCustomRoles, TestIAMPredefinedRoles, TestIAMServiceAccounts and TestIAMCredentialsImpersonation drive it through the official Go clients over gRPC and REST, and gcloud and Terraform tests run through the same endpoints.
Link to this answer

What did v0.1.0 have?

No IAM API. Its IAM Credentials endpoint minted local tokens without checking grants.
Link to this answer
Develop locally

Build against Google Cloud APIs, locally

Free and open source under Apache-2.0. No account, no sign-up, no Google Cloud bill.

Get started